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pkgs: init
2024-05-02 00:46:19 +00:00
commit 6d1e3fb07b45e2e31e469b16cf21b24bccf8914c
Author: Andreas K. Hüttel <dilfridge@gentoo.org>
Date: Wed Jan 31 02:12:43 2024 +0100
Replace advisories directory
Signed-off-by: Andreas K. Hüttel <dilfridge@gentoo.org>
diff --git a/ADVISORIES b/ADVISORIES
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d4e33f2df3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ADVISORIES
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+For the GNU C Library Security Advisories, see the git master branch:
+https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=tree;f=advisories;hb=HEAD
diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0001 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0001
deleted file mode 100644
index 3d19c91b6a..0000000000
--- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0001
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-printf: incorrect output for integers with thousands separator and width field
-
-When the printf family of functions is called with a format specifier
-that uses an <apostrophe> (enable grouping) and a minimum width
-specifier, the resulting output could be larger than reasonably expected
-by a caller that computed a tight bound on the buffer size. The
-resulting larger than expected output could result in a buffer overflow
-in the printf family of functions.
-
-CVE-Id: CVE-2023-25139
-Public-Date: 2023-02-02
-Vulnerable-Commit: e88b9f0e5cc50cab57a299dc7efe1a4eb385161d (2.37)
-Fix-Commit: c980549cc6a1c03c23cc2fe3e7b0fe626a0364b0 (2.38)
-Fix-Commit: 07b9521fc6369d000216b96562ff7c0ed32a16c4 (2.37-4)
diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0002 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0002
deleted file mode 100644
index 5122669a64..0000000000
--- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0002
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-getaddrinfo: Stack read overflow in no-aaaa mode
-
-If the system is configured in no-aaaa mode via /etc/resolv.conf,
-getaddrinfo is called for the AF_UNSPEC address family, and a DNS
-response is received over TCP that is larger than 2048 bytes,
-getaddrinfo may potentially disclose stack contents via the returned
-address data, or crash.
-
-CVE-Id: CVE-2023-4527
-Public-Date: 2023-09-12
-Vulnerable-Commit: f282cdbe7f436c75864e5640a409a10485e9abb2 (2.36)
-Fix-Commit: bd77dd7e73e3530203be1c52c8a29d08270cb25d (2.39)
-Fix-Commit: 4ea972b7edd7e36610e8cde18bf7a8149d7bac4f (2.36-113)
-Fix-Commit: b7529346025a130fee483d42178b5c118da971bb (2.37-38)
-Fix-Commit: b25508dd774b617f99419bdc3cf2ace4560cd2d6 (2.38-19)
diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0003 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0003
deleted file mode 100644
index d3aef80348..0000000000
--- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0003
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-getaddrinfo: Potential use-after-free
-
-When an NSS plugin only implements the _gethostbyname2_r and
-_getcanonname_r callbacks, getaddrinfo could use memory that was freed
-during buffer resizing, potentially causing a crash or read or write to
-arbitrary memory.
-
-CVE-Id: CVE-2023-4806
-Public-Date: 2023-09-12
-Fix-Commit: 973fe93a5675c42798b2161c6f29c01b0e243994 (2.39)
-Fix-Commit: e09ee267c03e3150c2c9ba28625ab130705a485e (2.34-420)
-Fix-Commit: e3ccb230a961b4797510e6a1f5f21fd9021853e7 (2.35-270)
-Fix-Commit: a9728f798ec7f05454c95637ee6581afaa9b487d (2.36-115)
-Fix-Commit: 6529a7466c935f36e9006b854d6f4e1d4876f942 (2.37-39)
-Fix-Commit: 00ae4f10b504bc4564e9f22f00907093f1ab9338 (2.38-20)
diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0004 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0004
deleted file mode 100644
index 5286a7aa54..0000000000
--- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0004
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-tunables: local privilege escalation through buffer overflow
-
-If a tunable of the form NAME=NAME=VAL is passed in the environment of a
-setuid program and NAME is valid, it may result in a buffer overflow,
-which could be exploited to achieve escalated privileges. This flaw was
-introduced in glibc 2.34.
-
-CVE-Id: CVE-2023-4911
-Public-Date: 2023-10-03
-Vulnerable-Commit: 2ed18c5b534d9e92fc006202a5af0df6b72e7aca (2.34)
-Fix-Commit: 1056e5b4c3f2d90ed2b4a55f96add28da2f4c8fa (2.39)
-Fix-Commit: dcc367f148bc92e7f3778a125f7a416b093964d9 (2.34-423)
-Fix-Commit: c84018a05aec80f5ee6f682db0da1130b0196aef (2.35-274)
-Fix-Commit: 22955ad85186ee05834e47e665056148ca07699c (2.36-118)
-Fix-Commit: b4e23c75aea756b4bddc4abcf27a1c6dca8b6bd3 (2.37-45)
-Fix-Commit: 750a45a783906a19591fb8ff6b7841470f1f5701 (2.38-27)
diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0005 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0005
deleted file mode 100644
index cc4eb90b82..0000000000
--- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2023-0005
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-getaddrinfo: DoS due to memory leak
-
-The fix for CVE-2023-4806 introduced a memory leak when an application
-calls getaddrinfo for AF_INET6 with AI_CANONNAME, AI_ALL and AI_V4MAPPED
-flags set.
-
-CVE-Id: CVE-2023-5156
-Public-Date: 2023-09-25
-Vulnerable-Commit: e09ee267c03e3150c2c9ba28625ab130705a485e (2.34-420)
-Vulnerable-Commit: e3ccb230a961b4797510e6a1f5f21fd9021853e7 (2.35-270)
-Vulnerable-Commit: a9728f798ec7f05454c95637ee6581afaa9b487d (2.36-115)
-Vulnerable-Commit: 6529a7466c935f36e9006b854d6f4e1d4876f942 (2.37-39)
-Vulnerable-Commit: 00ae4f10b504bc4564e9f22f00907093f1ab9338 (2.38-20)
-Fix-Commit: 8006457ab7e1cd556b919f477348a96fe88f2e49 (2.34-421)
-Fix-Commit: 17092c0311f954e6f3c010f73ce3a78c24ac279a (2.35-272)
-Fix-Commit: 856bac55f98dc840e7c27cfa82262b933385de90 (2.36-116)
-Fix-Commit: 4473d1b87d04b25cdd0e0354814eeaa421328268 (2.37-42)
-Fix-Commit: 5ee59ca371b99984232d7584fe2b1a758b4421d3 (2.38-24)
diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0001 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0001
deleted file mode 100644
index 28931c75ae..0000000000
--- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0001
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-syslog: Heap buffer overflow in __vsyslog_internal
-
-__vsyslog_internal did not handle a case where printing a SYSLOG_HEADER
-containing a long program name failed to update the required buffer
-size, leading to the allocation and overflow of a too-small buffer on
-the heap.
-
-CVE-Id: CVE-2023-6246
-Public-Date: 2024-01-30
-Vulnerable-Commit: 52a5be0df411ef3ff45c10c7c308cb92993d15b1 (2.37)
-Fix-Commit: 6bd0e4efcc78f3c0115e5ea9739a1642807450da (2.39)
-Fix-Commit: 23514c72b780f3da097ecf33a793b7ba9c2070d2 (2.38-42)
-Fix-Commit: 97a4292aa4a2642e251472b878d0ec4c46a0e59a (2.37-57)
-Vulnerable-Commit: b0e7888d1fa2dbd2d9e1645ec8c796abf78880b9 (2.36-16)
-Fix-Commit: d1a83b6767f68b3cb5b4b4ea2617254acd040c82 (2.36-126)
diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0002 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0002
deleted file mode 100644
index 940bfcf2fc..0000000000
--- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0002
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-syslog: Heap buffer overflow in __vsyslog_internal
-
-__vsyslog_internal used the return value of snprintf/vsnprintf to
-calculate buffer sizes for memory allocation. If these functions (for
-any reason) failed and returned -1, the resulting buffer would be too
-small to hold output.
-
-CVE-Id: CVE-2023-6779
-Public-Date: 2024-01-30
-Vulnerable-Commit: 52a5be0df411ef3ff45c10c7c308cb92993d15b1 (2.37)
-Fix-Commit: 7e5a0c286da33159d47d0122007aac016f3e02cd (2.39)
-Fix-Commit: d0338312aace5bbfef85e03055e1212dd0e49578 (2.38-43)
-Fix-Commit: 67062eccd9a65d7fda9976a56aeaaf6c25a80214 (2.37-58)
-Vulnerable-Commit: b0e7888d1fa2dbd2d9e1645ec8c796abf78880b9 (2.36-16)
-Fix-Commit: 2bc9d7c002bdac38b5c2a3f11b78e309d7765b83 (2.36-127)
diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0003 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0003
deleted file mode 100644
index b43a5150ab..0000000000
--- a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0003
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-syslog: Integer overflow in __vsyslog_internal
-
-__vsyslog_internal calculated a buffer size by adding two integers, but
-did not first check if the addition would overflow.
-
-CVE-Id: CVE-2023-6780
-Public-Date: 2024-01-30
-Vulnerable-Commit: 52a5be0df411ef3ff45c10c7c308cb92993d15b1 (2.37)
-Fix-Commit: ddf542da94caf97ff43cc2875c88749880b7259b (2.39)
-Fix-Commit: d37c2b20a4787463d192b32041c3406c2bd91de0 (2.38-44)
-Fix-Commit: 2b58cba076e912961ceaa5fa58588e4b10f791c0 (2.37-59)
-Vulnerable-Commit: b0e7888d1fa2dbd2d9e1645ec8c796abf78880b9 (2.36-16)
-Fix-Commit: b9b7d6a27aa0632f334352fa400771115b3c69b7 (2.36-128)
diff --git a/advisories/README b/advisories/README
deleted file mode 100644
index 94e68b1350..0000000000
--- a/advisories/README
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-GNU C Library Security Advisory Format
-======================================
-
-Security advisories in this directory follow a simple git commit log
-format, with a heading and free-format description augmented with tags
-to allow parsing key information. References to code changes are
-specific to the glibc repository and follow a specific format:
-
- Tag-name: <commit-ref> (release-version)
-
-The <commit-ref> indicates a specific commit in the repository. The
-release-version indicates the publicly consumable release in which this
-commit is known to exist. The release-version is derived from the
-git-describe format, (i.e. stripped out from glibc-2.34.NNN-gxxxx) and
-is of the form 2.34-NNN. If the -NNN suffix is absent, it means that
-the change is in that release tarball, otherwise the change is on the
-release/2.YY/master branch and not in any released tarball.
-
-The following tags are currently being used:
-
-CVE-Id:
-This is the CVE-Id assigned under the CVE Program
-(https://www.cve.org/).
-
-Public-Date:
-The date this issue became publicly known.
-
-Vulnerable-Commit:
-The commit that introduced this vulnerability. There could be multiple
-entries, one for each release branch in the glibc repository; the
-release-version portion of this tag should tell you which branch this is
-on.
-
-Fix-Commit:
-The commit that fixed this vulnerability. There could be multiple
-entries for each release branch in the glibc repository, indicating that
-all of those commits contributed to fixing that issue in each of those
-branches.
-
-Adding an Advisory
-------------------
-
-An advisory for a CVE needs to be added on the master branch in two steps:
-
-1. Add the text of the advisory without any Fix-Commit tags along with
- the fix for the CVE. Add the Vulnerable-Commit tag, if applicable.
- The advisories directory does not exist in release branches, so keep
- the advisory text commit distinct from the code changes, to ease
- backports. Ask for the GLIBC-SA advisory number from the security
- team.
-
-2. Finish all backports on release branches and then back on the msater
- branch, add all commit refs to the advisory using the Fix-Commit
- tags. Don't bother adding the release-version subscript since the
- next step will overwrite it.
-
-3. Run the process-advisories.sh script in the scripts directory on the
- advisory:
-
- scripts/process-advisories.sh update GLIBC-SA-YYYY-NNNN
-
- (replace YYYY-NNNN with the actual advisory number).
-
-4. Verify the updated advisory and push the result.
-
-Getting a NEWS snippet from advisories
---------------------------------------
-
-Run:
-
- scripts/process-advisories.sh news
-
-and copy the content into the NEWS file.
commit 63295e4fda1f6dab4bf7442706fe303bf283036c
Author: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
Date: Mon Feb 5 16:10:24 2024 +0000
arm: Remove wrong ldr from _dl_start_user (BZ 31339)
The commit 49d877a80b29d3002887b084eec6676d9f5fec18 (arm: Remove
_dl_skip_args usage) removed the _SKIP_ARGS literal, which was
previously loader to r4 on loader _start. However, the cleanup did not
remove the following 'ldr r4, [sl, r4]' on _dl_start_user, used to check
to skip the arguments after ld self-relocations.
In my testing, the kernel initially set r4 to 0, which makes the
ldr instruction just read the _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_. However, since r4
is a callee-saved register; a different runtime might not zero
initialize it and thus trigger an invalid memory access.
Checked on arm-linux-gnu.
Reported-by: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1e25112dc0cb2515d27d8d178b1ecce778a9d37a)
diff --git a/sysdeps/arm/dl-machine.h b/sysdeps/arm/dl-machine.h
index b857bbc868..dd1a0f6b6e 100644
--- a/sysdeps/arm/dl-machine.h
+++ b/sysdeps/arm/dl-machine.h
@@ -139,7 +139,6 @@ _start:\n\
_dl_start_user:\n\
adr r6, .L_GET_GOT\n\
add sl, sl, r6\n\
- ldr r4, [sl, r4]\n\
@ save the entry point in another register\n\
mov r6, r0\n\
@ get the original arg count\n\
commit 312e159626b67fe11f39e83e222cf4348a3962f3
Author: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
Date: Thu Feb 1 14:29:53 2024 -0300
mips: FIx clone3 implementation (BZ 31325)
For o32 we need to setup a minimal stack frame to allow cprestore
on __thread_start_clone3 (which instruct the linker to save the
gp for PIC). Also, there is no guarantee by kABI that $8 will be
preserved after syscall execution, so we need to save it on the
provided stack.
Checked on mipsel-linux-gnu.
Reported-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit bbd248ac0d75efdef8fe61ea69b1fb25fb95b6e7)
diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mips/clone3.S b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mips/clone3.S
index e9fec2fa47..481b8ae963 100644
--- a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mips/clone3.S
+++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/mips/clone3.S
@@ -37,11 +37,6 @@
.text
.set nomips16
-#if _MIPS_SIM == _ABIO32
-# define EXTRA_LOCALS 1
-#else
-# define EXTRA_LOCALS 0
-#endif
#define FRAMESZ ((NARGSAVE*SZREG)+ALSZ)&ALMASK
GPOFF= FRAMESZ-(1*SZREG)
NESTED(__clone3, SZREG, sp)
@@ -68,8 +63,31 @@ NESTED(__clone3, SZREG, sp)
beqz a0, L(error) /* No NULL cl_args pointer. */
beqz a2, L(error) /* No NULL function pointer. */
+#if _MIPS_SIM == _ABIO32
+ /* Both stack and stack_size on clone_args are defined as uint64_t, and
+ there is no need to handle values larger than to 32 bits for o32. */
+# if __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
+# define CL_STACKPOINTER_OFFSET 44
+# define CL_STACKSIZE_OFFSET 52
+# else
+# define CL_STACKPOINTER_OFFSET 40
+# define CL_STACKSIZE_OFFSET 48
+# endif
+
+ /* For o32 we need to setup a minimal stack frame to allow cprestore
+ on __thread_start_clone3. Also there is no guarantee by kABI that
+ $8 will be preserved after syscall execution (so we need to save it
+ on the provided stack). */
+ lw t0, CL_STACKPOINTER_OFFSET(a0) /* Load the stack pointer. */
+ lw t1, CL_STACKSIZE_OFFSET(a0) /* Load the stack_size. */
+ addiu t1, -32 /* Update the stack size. */
+ addu t2, t1, t0 /* Calculate the thread stack. */
+ sw a3, 0(t2) /* Save argument pointer. */
+ sw t1, CL_STACKSIZE_OFFSET(a0) /* Save the new stack size. */
+#else
move $8, a3 /* a3 is set to 0/1 for syscall success/error
while a4/$8 is returned unmodified. */
+#endif
/* Do the system call, the kernel expects:
v0: system call number
@@ -125,7 +143,11 @@ L(thread_start_clone3):
/* Restore the arg for user's function. */
move t9, a2 /* Function pointer. */
+#if _MIPS_SIM == _ABIO32
+ PTR_L a0, 0(sp)
+#else
move a0, $8 /* Argument pointer. */
+#endif
/* Call the user's function. */
jal t9
commit d0724994de40934c552f1f68de89053848a44927
Author: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Date: Thu Feb 22 21:26:55 2024 +0100
math: Update mips64 ulps
Signed-off-by: Andreas K. Hüttel <dilfridge@gentoo.org>
(cherry picked from commit e2a65ecc4b30a797df7dc6529f09b712aa256029)
diff --git a/sysdeps/mips/mips64/libm-test-ulps b/sysdeps/mips/mips64/libm-test-ulps
index 78969745b2..933aba4735 100644
--- a/sysdeps/mips/mips64/libm-test-ulps
+++ b/sysdeps/mips/mips64/libm-test-ulps
@@ -1066,17 +1066,17 @@ double: 1
ldouble: 1
Function: "j0":
-double: 2
+double: 3
float: 9
ldouble: 2
Function: "j0_downward":
-double: 5
+double: 6
float: 9
ldouble: 9
Function: "j0_towardzero":
-double: 6
+double: 7
float: 9
ldouble: 9
@@ -1146,6 +1146,7 @@ float: 6
ldouble: 8
Function: "log":
+double: 1
float: 1
ldouble: 1
commit e0910f1d3278f05439fb434ee528fc9be1b6bd5e
Author: Stefan Liebler <stli@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu Feb 22 15:03:27 2024 +0100
S390: Do not clobber r7 in clone [BZ #31402]
Starting with commit e57d8fc97b90127de4ed3e3a9cdf663667580935
"S390: Always use svc 0"
clone clobbers the call-saved register r7 in error case:
function or stack is NULL.
This patch restores the saved registers also in the error case.
Furthermore the existing test misc/tst-clone is extended to check
all error cases and that clone does not clobber registers in this
error case.
(cherry picked from commit 02782fd12849b6673cb5c2728cb750e8ec295aa3)
diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/s390/s390-32/clone.S b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/s390/s390-32/clone.S
index 4c882ef2ee..a7a863242c 100644
--- a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/s390/s390-32/clone.S
+++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/s390/s390-32/clone.S
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ ENTRY(__clone)
br %r14
error:
lhi %r2,-EINVAL
+ lm %r6,%r7,24(%r15) /* Load registers. */
j SYSCALL_ERROR_LABEL
PSEUDO_END (__clone)
diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/s390/s390-64/clone.S b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/s390/s390-64/clone.S
index 4eb104be71..c552a6b8de 100644
--- a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/s390/s390-64/clone.S
+++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/s390/s390-64/clone.S
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ ENTRY(__clone)
br %r14
error:
lghi %r2,-EINVAL
+ lmg %r6,%r7,48(%r15) /* Restore registers. */
jg SYSCALL_ERROR_LABEL
PSEUDO_END (__clone)
diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-clone.c b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-clone.c
index 470676ab2b..2bc7124983 100644
--- a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-clone.c
+++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-clone.c
@@ -16,12 +16,16 @@
License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
-/* BZ #2386 */
+/* BZ #2386, BZ #31402 */
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sched.h>
+#include <stackinfo.h> /* For _STACK_GROWS_{UP,DOWN}. */
+#include <support/check.h>
+
+volatile unsigned v = 0xdeadbeef;
int child_fn(void *arg)
{
@@ -30,22 +34,67 @@ int child_fn(void *arg)
}
static int
-do_test (void)
+__attribute__((noinline))
+do_clone (int (*fn)(void *), void *stack)
{
int result;
+ unsigned int a = v;
+ unsigned int b = v;
+ unsigned int c = v;
+ unsigned int d = v;
+ unsigned int e = v;
+ unsigned int f = v;
+ unsigned int g = v;
+ unsigned int h = v;
+ unsigned int i = v;
+ unsigned int j = v;
+ unsigned int k = v;
+ unsigned int l = v;
+ unsigned int m = v;
+ unsigned int n = v;
+ unsigned int o = v;
+
+ result = clone (fn, stack, 0, NULL);
+
+ /* Check that clone does not clobber call-saved registers. */
+ TEST_VERIFY (a == v && b == v && c == v && d == v && e == v && f == v
+ && g == v && h == v && i == v && j == v && k == v && l == v
+ && m == v && n == v && o == v);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static void
+__attribute__((noinline))
+do_test_single (int (*fn)(void *), void *stack)
+{
+ printf ("%s (fn=%p, stack=%p)\n", __FUNCTION__, fn, stack);
+ errno = 0;
+
+ int result = do_clone (fn, stack);
+
+ TEST_COMPARE (errno, EINVAL);
+ TEST_COMPARE (result, -1);
+}
- result = clone (child_fn, NULL, 0, NULL);
+static int
+do_test (void)
+{
+ char st[128 * 1024] __attribute__ ((aligned));
+ void *stack = NULL;
+#if _STACK_GROWS_DOWN
+ stack = st + sizeof (st);
+#elif _STACK_GROWS_UP
+ stack = st;
+#else
+# error "Define either _STACK_GROWS_DOWN or _STACK_GROWS_UP"
+#endif
- if (errno != EINVAL || result != -1)
- {
- printf ("FAIL: clone()=%d (wanted -1) errno=%d (wanted %d)\n",
- result, errno, EINVAL);
- return 1;
- }
+ do_test_single (child_fn, NULL);
+ do_test_single (NULL, stack);
+ do_test_single (NULL, NULL);
- puts ("All OK");
return 0;
}
-#define TEST_FUNCTION do_test ()
-#include "../test-skeleton.c"
+#include <support/test-driver.c>
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